SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
A.V. PAPAYYA SASTRY & ORS VS. GOVERNMENT OF A.P.
& ORS
& ORS
DATED : 07.03.2007
Summarised
Judgement (Scroll for Complete Judgement)
Judgement (Scroll for Complete Judgement)
Introduction:
All these appeals have been preferred by
the appellants against common judgment and order passed in WAMP No. 1879 of
2001 in W.A. No. 109 of 1997, WAMP No. 1880 of 2001 in W.A. No. 292 of 1998 and
Contempt Case No. 1008 of 2001. By the said order, the High Court recalled
common judgment and order passed on April 27, 2000 in Writ Appeal Nos. 109 of
1997 and 292 of 1998. A direction was also issued to the authorities under the
Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1976 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the
Ceiling Act’) to complete proceedings within the stipulated period.
the appellants against common judgment and order passed in WAMP No. 1879 of
2001 in W.A. No. 109 of 1997, WAMP No. 1880 of 2001 in W.A. No. 292 of 1998 and
Contempt Case No. 1008 of 2001. By the said order, the High Court recalled
common judgment and order passed on April 27, 2000 in Writ Appeal Nos. 109 of
1997 and 292 of 1998. A direction was also issued to the authorities under the
Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1976 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the
Ceiling Act’) to complete proceedings within the stipulated period.
Facts
of the Case:
of the Case:
The case has a long and checkered
history starting from early seventies of the last admeasuring 18 acres, 39
cents of Village Kancharapalem, District Visakhapatnam. It was their case that
Visakhapatnam Port Trust (‘Port Trust’ for short) wanted to acquire land for
public purpose, namely, for construction of quarters for its employees. The
Chairman of the Port Trust, therefore, sent a requisition letter to the
District Collector, Visakhapatnam for acquiring land admeasuring 45 acres, 33
cents of Survey Nos. 1, 2, 3 and 4 of Kancharapalem Village. Advance possession
of the land of the appellants, bearing Survey Nos. 3/1, 3/2 and 4 admeasuring 18
acres, 39 cents was taken over by the Estate Manager of the Port Trust on
August 29, 1972 by private negotiations.
history starting from early seventies of the last admeasuring 18 acres, 39
cents of Village Kancharapalem, District Visakhapatnam. It was their case that
Visakhapatnam Port Trust (‘Port Trust’ for short) wanted to acquire land for
public purpose, namely, for construction of quarters for its employees. The
Chairman of the Port Trust, therefore, sent a requisition letter to the
District Collector, Visakhapatnam for acquiring land admeasuring 45 acres, 33
cents of Survey Nos. 1, 2, 3 and 4 of Kancharapalem Village. Advance possession
of the land of the appellants, bearing Survey Nos. 3/1, 3/2 and 4 admeasuring 18
acres, 39 cents was taken over by the Estate Manager of the Port Trust on
August 29, 1972 by private negotiations.
Observation
of Court :
of Court :
Before parting with the matter, we may
state that all the observations made by us hereinabove have been made only for
the purpose of deciding the legality and validity of the order passed by the
High Court. We may clarify that we may not be understood to have expressed any
opinion on merits of the matter one way or the other. Therefore, as and when
the matter will be considered by the authorities in pursuance of the directions
of the High Court, it will be decided on its own merits without being inhibited
by the observations made by us in this judgment.
state that all the observations made by us hereinabove have been made only for
the purpose of deciding the legality and validity of the order passed by the
High Court. We may clarify that we may not be understood to have expressed any
opinion on merits of the matter one way or the other. Therefore, as and when
the matter will be considered by the authorities in pursuance of the directions
of the High Court, it will be decided on its own merits without being inhibited
by the observations made by us in this judgment.
Judgement:
For the foregoing reasons, the appeals
deserve to be dismissed and are accordingly dismissed with costs.
deserve to be dismissed and are accordingly dismissed with costs.
—————————————————
SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
A.V. PAPAYYA SASTRY & ORS VS. GOVERNMENT OF A.P. & ORS
DATED : 07.03.2007
Author : C Thakker
Bench : C.K. Thakker,
Lokeshwar Singh Panta
Lokeshwar Singh Panta
CASE NO. : Appeal (civil) 5097-5099 of 2004
PETITIONER : A.V. PAPAYYA SASTRY
& ORS
& ORS
RESPONDENT : GOVERNMENT OF A.P.
& ORS
& ORS
DATE OF JUDGMENT:
07/03/2007
07/03/2007
BENCH : C.K. THAKKER &
LOKESHWAR SINGH PANTA
LOKESHWAR SINGH PANTA
JUDGEMENT C.K.
THAKKER, J.
THAKKER, J.
All these appeals have
been preferred by the appellants against common judgment and order passed in
WAMP No. 1879 of 2001 in W.A. No. 109 of 1997, WAMP No. 1880 of 2001 in W.A.
No. 292 of 1998 and Contempt Case No. 1008 of 2001. By the said order, the High
Court recalled common judgment and order passed on April 27, 2000 in Writ
Appeal Nos. 109 of 1997 and 292 of 1998. A direction was also issued to the
authorities under the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1976
(hereinafter referred to as ‘the Ceiling Act’) to complete proceedings within
the stipulated period.
been preferred by the appellants against common judgment and order passed in
WAMP No. 1879 of 2001 in W.A. No. 109 of 1997, WAMP No. 1880 of 2001 in W.A.
No. 292 of 1998 and Contempt Case No. 1008 of 2001. By the said order, the High
Court recalled common judgment and order passed on April 27, 2000 in Writ
Appeal Nos. 109 of 1997 and 292 of 1998. A direction was also issued to the
authorities under the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1976
(hereinafter referred to as ‘the Ceiling Act’) to complete proceedings within
the stipulated period.
The case has a long and
checkered history starting from early seventies of the last century. Appellants
herein are the owners of land bearing Survey Nos. 3/1, 3/2 and 4 admeasuring 18
acres, 39 cents of Village Kancharapalem, District Visakhapatnam. It was their
case that Visakhapatnam Port Trust (‘Port Trust’ for short) wanted to acquire
land for public purpose, namely, for construction of quarters for its
employees. The Chairman of the Port Trust, therefore, sent a requisition letter
to the District Collector, Visakhapatnam for acquiring land admeasuring 45
acres, 33 cents of Survey Nos. 1, 2, 3 and 4 of Kancharapalem Village. Advance
possession of the land of the appellants, bearing Survey Nos. 3/1, 3/2 and 4
admeasuring 18 acres, 39 cents was taken over by the Estate Manager of the Port
Trust on August 29, 1972 by private negotiations.
checkered history starting from early seventies of the last century. Appellants
herein are the owners of land bearing Survey Nos. 3/1, 3/2 and 4 admeasuring 18
acres, 39 cents of Village Kancharapalem, District Visakhapatnam. It was their
case that Visakhapatnam Port Trust (‘Port Trust’ for short) wanted to acquire
land for public purpose, namely, for construction of quarters for its
employees. The Chairman of the Port Trust, therefore, sent a requisition letter
to the District Collector, Visakhapatnam for acquiring land admeasuring 45
acres, 33 cents of Survey Nos. 1, 2, 3 and 4 of Kancharapalem Village. Advance
possession of the land of the appellants, bearing Survey Nos. 3/1, 3/2 and 4
admeasuring 18 acres, 39 cents was taken over by the Estate Manager of the Port
Trust on August 29, 1972 by private negotiations.
The State Authorities,
thereafter, were requested by the Port Trust Authorities to take appropriate
proceedings for acquisition of land under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894.
According to the appellants, in the statement recorded on August 29, 1972,
Akella Suryanarayana Rao stated that he had handed onver possession of the land
to the Estate Manager of the Port Trust. Mr. Akella also stated that there was
a dispute regarding land with tenant Koyya Gurumurthy Reddy under Andhra
Pradesh Lands Tenancy Act. It was also the case of the appellants that the Port
Trust deposited with the Government the amount of compensation payable to the
owners of the land. The land acquisition proposals were approved by the Port
Trust as also by the Government of India.
thereafter, were requested by the Port Trust Authorities to take appropriate
proceedings for acquisition of land under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894.
According to the appellants, in the statement recorded on August 29, 1972,
Akella Suryanarayana Rao stated that he had handed onver possession of the land
to the Estate Manager of the Port Trust. Mr. Akella also stated that there was
a dispute regarding land with tenant Koyya Gurumurthy Reddy under Andhra
Pradesh Lands Tenancy Act. It was also the case of the appellants that the Port
Trust deposited with the Government the amount of compensation payable to the
owners of the land. The land acquisition proposals were approved by the Port
Trust as also by the Government of India.
It was further case of
the appellants that a preliminary notification under sub-section (1) of Section
4 of the Land Acquisition Act was for the first time issued on August 10, 1973
but nothing further was done in the matter. The Ceiling Act came into force in
the State of Andhra Pradesh on February 17, 1976. It, inter alia, covered the
Visakhapatnam Urban Agglomeration. The appellants filed their declarations
taking the stand that possession of land had already been handed over to Port
Trust Authorities even before the Act came into force and the provisions of the
Ceiling Act, therefore, would not apply to such land. In the light of the above
factual position and the case of the appellants, the Special Officer and
Competent Authority, Urban Land Ceiling, Visakhapatnam vide his order dated May
25, 1981 in C.C. No. 6143 of 1976 declared that the land- owners of Survey Nos.
3/1, 3/2 and 4 were ‘non-surplus land holders’. Then the Government again
issued notification under sub-section (1) of Section 4 of the Act on August 29,
1981. Urgency clause under Section 17(4) was not invoked since the possession
of land was already with the Port Trust Authorities. A declaration under
Section 6 was issued on October 12, 1982. No award, however, was passed.
the appellants that a preliminary notification under sub-section (1) of Section
4 of the Land Acquisition Act was for the first time issued on August 10, 1973
but nothing further was done in the matter. The Ceiling Act came into force in
the State of Andhra Pradesh on February 17, 1976. It, inter alia, covered the
Visakhapatnam Urban Agglomeration. The appellants filed their declarations
taking the stand that possession of land had already been handed over to Port
Trust Authorities even before the Act came into force and the provisions of the
Ceiling Act, therefore, would not apply to such land. In the light of the above
factual position and the case of the appellants, the Special Officer and
Competent Authority, Urban Land Ceiling, Visakhapatnam vide his order dated May
25, 1981 in C.C. No. 6143 of 1976 declared that the land- owners of Survey Nos.
3/1, 3/2 and 4 were ‘non-surplus land holders’. Then the Government again
issued notification under sub-section (1) of Section 4 of the Act on August 29,
1981. Urgency clause under Section 17(4) was not invoked since the possession
of land was already with the Port Trust Authorities. A declaration under
Section 6 was issued on October 12, 1982. No award, however, was passed.
According to the
appellants, the Chief Engineer of Port Trust in reply to a query by the Land
Acquisition Officer, clarified vide his letter dated December 19, 1985 that
actual and physical possession of the land was not taken by Port Trust as the
tenant did not vacate possession of the land. It appears that in view of the
above letter that physical possession of land was not with the Port Trust
Authorities, the Special Officer and Competent Authority, Urban Land Ceiling,
Visakhapatnam referred the matter to the Commissioner, Land Reforms and Urban
Land Ceiling, Government of Andhra Pradesh, Hyderabad in February, 1987 to take
up the matter under Section 34 of the Ceiling Act in suo motu revision. The
Collector, Visakhapatnam also vide his D.O. letter No. 433/78, dated June 27,
1987 requested the Commissioner to reopen the case and start enquiry.
appellants, the Chief Engineer of Port Trust in reply to a query by the Land
Acquisition Officer, clarified vide his letter dated December 19, 1985 that
actual and physical possession of the land was not taken by Port Trust as the
tenant did not vacate possession of the land. It appears that in view of the
above letter that physical possession of land was not with the Port Trust
Authorities, the Special Officer and Competent Authority, Urban Land Ceiling,
Visakhapatnam referred the matter to the Commissioner, Land Reforms and Urban
Land Ceiling, Government of Andhra Pradesh, Hyderabad in February, 1987 to take
up the matter under Section 34 of the Ceiling Act in suo motu revision. The
Collector, Visakhapatnam also vide his D.O. letter No. 433/78, dated June 27,
1987 requested the Commissioner to reopen the case and start enquiry.
On August
21, 1989, Chairman, Visakhapatnam Port Trust addressed a letter to the
Commissioner, Land Reforms & Urban Land Ceiling, Government of A.P.
categorically stating that land admeasuring 18 acres, 39 cents of Survey Nos.
3/1, 3/2 and 4 of Kancherapalem village had already been taken over by the Port
Trust and there was no cause to reopen the case under Section 34 of the Ceiling
Act. Once again, the Government approved the proposal for acquisition of land
and notification under Section 4(1) of the Land Acquisition Act was issued on
May 17, 1991. It appears that the proceedings for reopening of the case by
invoking Section 34 of the Ceiling Act were initiated.
21, 1989, Chairman, Visakhapatnam Port Trust addressed a letter to the
Commissioner, Land Reforms & Urban Land Ceiling, Government of A.P.
categorically stating that land admeasuring 18 acres, 39 cents of Survey Nos.
3/1, 3/2 and 4 of Kancherapalem village had already been taken over by the Port
Trust and there was no cause to reopen the case under Section 34 of the Ceiling
Act. Once again, the Government approved the proposal for acquisition of land
and notification under Section 4(1) of the Land Acquisition Act was issued on
May 17, 1991. It appears that the proceedings for reopening of the case by
invoking Section 34 of the Ceiling Act were initiated.
On July 20, 1994, notice
was issued to the owners to show cause as to why revisional powers should not
be exercised and the order passed by the Special Officer and Competent
Authority under the Ceiling Act should not be set aside. It was also stated in
the notice that it was brought to the notice of the Government that title to
the land was undisputedly with the declarants on the appointed day under the
Ceiling Act as the Land Acquisition Proceedings were not concluded by that
date. As such land was required to be computed in the holdings of the
declarants even if it was admitted by the Port Trust Authorities that they were
in possession of the land in 1972. The land-owners submitted the reply to the
notice.
was issued to the owners to show cause as to why revisional powers should not
be exercised and the order passed by the Special Officer and Competent
Authority under the Ceiling Act should not be set aside. It was also stated in
the notice that it was brought to the notice of the Government that title to
the land was undisputedly with the declarants on the appointed day under the
Ceiling Act as the Land Acquisition Proceedings were not concluded by that
date. As such land was required to be computed in the holdings of the
declarants even if it was admitted by the Port Trust Authorities that they were
in possession of the land in 1972. The land-owners submitted the reply to the
notice.
Meanwhile, however, the
land-owners filed a petition being Writ Petition No. 11754 of 1994 praying
therein that the High Court may direct the State Authorities to complete
proceedings under the Land Acquisition Act and pass an award. During the
pendency of the writ petition the revision was allowed by the State Government
under Section 34 of the Ceiling Act on January 20, 1995 and the order passed by
the Special Officer and Competent Authority, Urban Land Ceiling, Visakhapatnam
declaring that the appellants had no surplus land had been set aside. The
appellants, therefore, filed another petition, being Writ Petition No. 3102 of
1995 questioning the legality of the order passed in revision.
land-owners filed a petition being Writ Petition No. 11754 of 1994 praying
therein that the High Court may direct the State Authorities to complete
proceedings under the Land Acquisition Act and pass an award. During the
pendency of the writ petition the revision was allowed by the State Government
under Section 34 of the Ceiling Act on January 20, 1995 and the order passed by
the Special Officer and Competent Authority, Urban Land Ceiling, Visakhapatnam
declaring that the appellants had no surplus land had been set aside. The
appellants, therefore, filed another petition, being Writ Petition No. 3102 of
1995 questioning the legality of the order passed in revision.
The learned
single Judge allowed both the petitions i.e. Writ Petition Nos. 11754 of 1994
and 3102 of 1995 and by order dated June 4, 1996 directed the authorities to
complete Land Acquisition Proceedings and pass award within three months. The
learned single Judge also held that the order under the Ceiling Act was passed
by the Special Officer and Competent Authority, Urban Land Ceiling,
Visakhapatnam in 1981 while suo motu revisional powers were exercised in
1994-95 i.e. after thirteen years.
single Judge allowed both the petitions i.e. Writ Petition Nos. 11754 of 1994
and 3102 of 1995 and by order dated June 4, 1996 directed the authorities to
complete Land Acquisition Proceedings and pass award within three months. The
learned single Judge also held that the order under the Ceiling Act was passed
by the Special Officer and Competent Authority, Urban Land Ceiling,
Visakhapatnam in 1981 while suo motu revisional powers were exercised in
1994-95 i.e. after thirteen years.
Such action was, therefore, illegal,
unlawful and unwarranted. Accordingly, the order passed in revision was set
aside. Writ appeals filed by the State were dismissed. A direction was issued
by the Division Bench to fix market value on the basis of notification under
Section 4(1) issued on May 17, 1991. Special Leave Petition (Civil) Nos.
14860-14861 of 2000 filed by the State Authorities were dismissed by this Court
on October 20, 2000.
unlawful and unwarranted. Accordingly, the order passed in revision was set
aside. Writ appeals filed by the State were dismissed. A direction was issued
by the Division Bench to fix market value on the basis of notification under
Section 4(1) issued on May 17, 1991. Special Leave Petition (Civil) Nos.
14860-14861 of 2000 filed by the State Authorities were dismissed by this Court
on October 20, 2000.
The State Authorities,
thereafter, filed recall- applications on June 13, 2001. In the recall
applications, it was stated inter alia that fraud was committed by the
land-owners and material facts were suppressed by them. It was alleged that
possession of land was never handed over to Port Trust Authorities, nor Port
Trust Authorities received such possession of land and yet it was asserted by
the owners that possession of land was given to Port Trust Authorities in 1972
which was not correct. It was only in December, 1985 that the correct fact came
to the knowledge of the State Authorities from a letter by the Chief Engineer
of Port Trust. Hence, the order was taken in suo motu revision under Section 34
of the Ceiling Act.
thereafter, filed recall- applications on June 13, 2001. In the recall
applications, it was stated inter alia that fraud was committed by the
land-owners and material facts were suppressed by them. It was alleged that
possession of land was never handed over to Port Trust Authorities, nor Port
Trust Authorities received such possession of land and yet it was asserted by
the owners that possession of land was given to Port Trust Authorities in 1972
which was not correct. It was only in December, 1985 that the correct fact came
to the knowledge of the State Authorities from a letter by the Chief Engineer
of Port Trust. Hence, the order was taken in suo motu revision under Section 34
of the Ceiling Act.
It was further stated that even if the Port Trust
Authorities would be deemed to be in possession of land on the day the Ceiling
Act came into force, Land Acquisition Proceedings were not concluded and no
award was passed. The Port Trust Authorities, in the circumstances, would be in
possession of the land for and on behalf of the land-owners and the land was
required to be declared surplus and vacant under the Ceiling Act.
Authorities would be deemed to be in possession of land on the day the Ceiling
Act came into force, Land Acquisition Proceedings were not concluded and no
award was passed. The Port Trust Authorities, in the circumstances, would be in
possession of the land for and on behalf of the land-owners and the land was
required to be declared surplus and vacant under the Ceiling Act.
It was further averred
that the High Court ordered inquiry by the Central Bureau of Investigation
(CBI) and Mr. Y. Anil Kumar, IPS, Superintendent of Police, CBI, Visakhapatnam
submitted a detailed report in the High Court when the Writ Appeals were placed
for hearing. Unfortunately, however, the attention of the Court was never invited
to the said report which clearly revealed that there was total fraud on the
part of the land-owners in collusion with Port Trust Officers as also Officers
acting under the Ceiling Act. It was, therefore, submitted that the orders
passed by the Division Bench on April 27, 2000 was required to be recalled by
directing the authorities under the Ceiling Act to conclude proceedings.
that the High Court ordered inquiry by the Central Bureau of Investigation
(CBI) and Mr. Y. Anil Kumar, IPS, Superintendent of Police, CBI, Visakhapatnam
submitted a detailed report in the High Court when the Writ Appeals were placed
for hearing. Unfortunately, however, the attention of the Court was never invited
to the said report which clearly revealed that there was total fraud on the
part of the land-owners in collusion with Port Trust Officers as also Officers
acting under the Ceiling Act. It was, therefore, submitted that the orders
passed by the Division Bench on April 27, 2000 was required to be recalled by
directing the authorities under the Ceiling Act to conclude proceedings.
The High Court, after
hearing the learned counsel for the parties and considering the records and
proceedings including the report submitted by CBI, held that the case was of a
fraud and by suppressing material facts, several orders were passed and actions
were taken. In view of correct and true facts and reports which clearly
established that the authorities were misled, that proceedings were initiated
to revise the order, dated May 25, 1981. The Court, therefore, held that the
order dated April 27, 2004 passed by the Division Bench was required to be
recalled and recall applications were allowed.
hearing the learned counsel for the parties and considering the records and
proceedings including the report submitted by CBI, held that the case was of a
fraud and by suppressing material facts, several orders were passed and actions
were taken. In view of correct and true facts and reports which clearly
established that the authorities were misled, that proceedings were initiated
to revise the order, dated May 25, 1981. The Court, therefore, held that the
order dated April 27, 2004 passed by the Division Bench was required to be
recalled and recall applications were allowed.
The Court therefore
passed the following order; “Considering all the aspects as stated above,
we are of the considered view that the recall petitions have to be allowed.
passed the following order; “Considering all the aspects as stated above,
we are of the considered view that the recall petitions have to be allowed.
Accordingly we allow
the recall petitions by setting aside the common judgment passed in the
aforesaid writ appeals.
the recall petitions by setting aside the common judgment passed in the
aforesaid writ appeals.
We further direct that
the proceedings under ULC Act have to be completed within a period of one month
from the date of receipt of this order by the concerned authorities by giving
opportunity to the petitioners and respondents herein to put forward their
cases and after final decision is taken by the authorities under ULC Act, the
further proceedings have to be initiated under Land Acquisition Act depending
upon the result under the ULC Act. The proceedings under the Land Acquisition
Act if initiated, compensation to be awarded to the respondents herein within a
period of three months from the date of order of the authorities under the ULC
Act. The Land Acquisition Officer is also directed to consider the legal date
of possession of the land taken by the VPT Authorities after conclusion of the
enquiry under the ULC Act”.
the proceedings under ULC Act have to be completed within a period of one month
from the date of receipt of this order by the concerned authorities by giving
opportunity to the petitioners and respondents herein to put forward their
cases and after final decision is taken by the authorities under ULC Act, the
further proceedings have to be initiated under Land Acquisition Act depending
upon the result under the ULC Act. The proceedings under the Land Acquisition
Act if initiated, compensation to be awarded to the respondents herein within a
period of three months from the date of order of the authorities under the ULC
Act. The Land Acquisition Officer is also directed to consider the legal date
of possession of the land taken by the VPT Authorities after conclusion of the
enquiry under the ULC Act”.
The appellants have
challenged the aforesaid order of the High Court. On August 5, 2002, notice was
issued by this Court. Affidavits and counter affidavits were filed. On August
6, 2004, leave was granted and hearing was expedited and the matters were
placed before us for final hearing.
challenged the aforesaid order of the High Court. On August 5, 2002, notice was
issued by this Court. Affidavits and counter affidavits were filed. On August
6, 2004, leave was granted and hearing was expedited and the matters were
placed before us for final hearing.
We have heard learned
counsel for the parties. Mr. K.K. Venugopal, Senior Advocate, appearing for the
appellants contended that the High Court committed an error in law in passing
the impugned order. It was clear from the evidence on record and various
communications that before the proposal was submitted by the Port Trust
Authorities for acquisition of land for a public purpose (construction of
quarters for its employees), advance possession of land had been taken over by
Port Trust Authorities and land-owners were not in possession of the property.
The said fact was noted by the Special Officer and Competent Authority, Urband
Land Ceiling, Visakhapatnam and an order was passed in May, 1981 that the
appellants were ‘not surplus land owners’. In or about 1985, however, there
appeared to be encroachment over the land and some officers of the Port Trust,
with a view to save their skin, wrote a letter on December 19, 1985 that the
possession of land had not been handed over to Port Trust Authorities since
tenants were occupying the land.
counsel for the parties. Mr. K.K. Venugopal, Senior Advocate, appearing for the
appellants contended that the High Court committed an error in law in passing
the impugned order. It was clear from the evidence on record and various
communications that before the proposal was submitted by the Port Trust
Authorities for acquisition of land for a public purpose (construction of
quarters for its employees), advance possession of land had been taken over by
Port Trust Authorities and land-owners were not in possession of the property.
The said fact was noted by the Special Officer and Competent Authority, Urband
Land Ceiling, Visakhapatnam and an order was passed in May, 1981 that the
appellants were ‘not surplus land owners’. In or about 1985, however, there
appeared to be encroachment over the land and some officers of the Port Trust,
with a view to save their skin, wrote a letter on December 19, 1985 that the
possession of land had not been handed over to Port Trust Authorities since
tenants were occupying the land.
The said statement was not correct and could
not have been considered for initiating proceedings under the Ceiling Act. It
was also submitted by the counsel that suo motu power was sought to be
exercised after a decade. As per settled law, revisional powers should be
exercised within ‘reasonable time’. By no stretch of imagination, more than ten
years can be said to be ‘reasonable time’. According to the learned counsel,
learned single Judge was wholly justified in allowing both the writ petitions
filed by the land-owners and in issuing directions, namely, (i) to complete
land acquisition proceedings and pass award; and (ii) exercise of revisional
powers after about thirteen years was wholly unwarranted.
not have been considered for initiating proceedings under the Ceiling Act. It
was also submitted by the counsel that suo motu power was sought to be
exercised after a decade. As per settled law, revisional powers should be
exercised within ‘reasonable time’. By no stretch of imagination, more than ten
years can be said to be ‘reasonable time’. According to the learned counsel,
learned single Judge was wholly justified in allowing both the writ petitions
filed by the land-owners and in issuing directions, namely, (i) to complete
land acquisition proceedings and pass award; and (ii) exercise of revisional
powers after about thirteen years was wholly unwarranted.
The said order was
confirmed by the Division Bench in Writ Appeals. Special Leave Petitions were
also dismissed by this Court. After dismissal of Special Leave Petitions,
neither it was open to the authorities to make an application for recalling
earlier orders as has been done in June, 2001, nor it was permissible for the
Court to grant such relief. It was also submitted that the Division Bench, while
dealing with Writ Appeals took note of the fact that the land was ‘agricultural
land’ and was having fruit bearing trees i.e. a garden land. The said finding
had not been disturbed even by this Court in SLPs. The Division Bench ought to
have taken into account that fact as well. By not doing so, an illegality had
been committed and the order deserves to be set aside.
confirmed by the Division Bench in Writ Appeals. Special Leave Petitions were
also dismissed by this Court. After dismissal of Special Leave Petitions,
neither it was open to the authorities to make an application for recalling
earlier orders as has been done in June, 2001, nor it was permissible for the
Court to grant such relief. It was also submitted that the Division Bench, while
dealing with Writ Appeals took note of the fact that the land was ‘agricultural
land’ and was having fruit bearing trees i.e. a garden land. The said finding
had not been disturbed even by this Court in SLPs. The Division Bench ought to
have taken into account that fact as well. By not doing so, an illegality had
been committed and the order deserves to be set aside.
The learned counsel for
the State Authorities as also Port Trust Authorities supported the order passed
by the High Court and action of recalling of the order dated April 27, 2000. It
was submitted that the authorities proceeded on the basis that advance
possession of the land was given by land-owners to Port Trust Authorities in
August, 1972. But the statement was not correct and the authorities were
misled. The order passed by the Special Officer and Competent Authority under
the Ceiling Act declaring that the owners did not possess surplus land was
founded on the above statement that the land-owners were not in possession of
land, which was false. But even otherwise, the order passed by the Special
Officer and Competent Authority was not in consonance with law inasmuch as even
if the owners were not in possession of land, proceedings under the Land
Acquisition Act were not finalized.
the State Authorities as also Port Trust Authorities supported the order passed
by the High Court and action of recalling of the order dated April 27, 2000. It
was submitted that the authorities proceeded on the basis that advance
possession of the land was given by land-owners to Port Trust Authorities in
August, 1972. But the statement was not correct and the authorities were
misled. The order passed by the Special Officer and Competent Authority under
the Ceiling Act declaring that the owners did not possess surplus land was
founded on the above statement that the land-owners were not in possession of
land, which was false. But even otherwise, the order passed by the Special
Officer and Competent Authority was not in consonance with law inasmuch as even
if the owners were not in possession of land, proceedings under the Land
Acquisition Act were not finalized.
The legal position is that the ownership of
the land-owners continued and in the eye of law, Port Trust Authorities
remained in possession for and on behalf of the land-owners. It was, therefore,
incumbent on Special Officer and Competent Authority under the Ceiling Act to
declare land to be excess and surplus under the Ceiling Act so that appropriate
consequential action could be taken. No such action, however, was taken.
Moreover, it was made clear by the Chief Engineer, Port Trust vide his letter
dated December 19, 1985 that actual and physical possession of land was never
taken by Port Trust Authorities as it remained with tenants and disputes were
going on. The matter, therefore, required detailed investigation.
the land-owners continued and in the eye of law, Port Trust Authorities
remained in possession for and on behalf of the land-owners. It was, therefore,
incumbent on Special Officer and Competent Authority under the Ceiling Act to
declare land to be excess and surplus under the Ceiling Act so that appropriate
consequential action could be taken. No such action, however, was taken.
Moreover, it was made clear by the Chief Engineer, Port Trust vide his letter
dated December 19, 1985 that actual and physical possession of land was never
taken by Port Trust Authorities as it remained with tenants and disputes were
going on. The matter, therefore, required detailed investigation.
The CBI made an enquiry
and the report was submitted by the Police Inspector which revealed startling
facts. From the report, it is clear that fraud was committed by the land owners
in collusion with officers of the respondents. Criminal proceedings were also
initiated and they are pending. It was, therefore, submitted that the High
Court was right in recalling its earlier order.
and the report was submitted by the Police Inspector which revealed startling
facts. From the report, it is clear that fraud was committed by the land owners
in collusion with officers of the respondents. Criminal proceedings were also
initiated and they are pending. It was, therefore, submitted that the High
Court was right in recalling its earlier order.
Regarding
non-applicability of the provisions of the Ceiling Act as the land being garden
land and hence agricultural land under the Ceiling Act, it was submitted that
it was never the case of the land-owners when proceedings under the Ceiling Act
had been initiated that the Act would not apply because the land was used for
agriculture. The sole ground put forward by the land- owners was that
possession of land had already been given to Port Trust Authorities and hence
the Ceiling Act had no application. It was, therefore, submitted that the
appeals deserve to be dismissed and the impugned order calls for no
interference.
non-applicability of the provisions of the Ceiling Act as the land being garden
land and hence agricultural land under the Ceiling Act, it was submitted that
it was never the case of the land-owners when proceedings under the Ceiling Act
had been initiated that the Act would not apply because the land was used for
agriculture. The sole ground put forward by the land- owners was that
possession of land had already been given to Port Trust Authorities and hence
the Ceiling Act had no application. It was, therefore, submitted that the
appeals deserve to be dismissed and the impugned order calls for no
interference.
Having given anxious
consideration to the rival contentions of the parties, in our opinion, no case
has been made out by the appellants for interference with the order passed by
the High Court allowing the applications and recalling earlier order. The High
Court has considered the matter in detail. The case of land- owners was that
advance possession was taken over by Port Trust Authorities in August, 1972.
The subsequent facts and letter by Chief Engineer of Port Trust in 1985 clearly
revealed that it was not so. Possession of land was never with the land owners and
was not given to Port Trust Authorities. From the record it is clear that
neither the land-owners nor the Port Trust Authorities were in actual or
physical possession of land, but it was occupied by tenants and disputes were
also going on between the tenants and land owners. Therefore, the basis on
which the Special Officer and Competent Authority, Urban Land Ceiling proceeded
to decide the matter was non-existent and non est. In our opinion, the learned
counsel for the respondents are also right in submitting that even if the
statement of land-owners and Port Trust Authorities is believed and it is held
that actual and physical possession of land was handed over by land-owners and
taken over by Port Trust Authorities, it does not change the legal position. It
was not the case of land-owners themselves that proceedings under the Land
Acquisition Act were finalized and award was passed. From the record, it is
clear that no notification under the Land Acquisition Act was issued in 1972.
consideration to the rival contentions of the parties, in our opinion, no case
has been made out by the appellants for interference with the order passed by
the High Court allowing the applications and recalling earlier order. The High
Court has considered the matter in detail. The case of land- owners was that
advance possession was taken over by Port Trust Authorities in August, 1972.
The subsequent facts and letter by Chief Engineer of Port Trust in 1985 clearly
revealed that it was not so. Possession of land was never with the land owners and
was not given to Port Trust Authorities. From the record it is clear that
neither the land-owners nor the Port Trust Authorities were in actual or
physical possession of land, but it was occupied by tenants and disputes were
also going on between the tenants and land owners. Therefore, the basis on
which the Special Officer and Competent Authority, Urban Land Ceiling proceeded
to decide the matter was non-existent and non est. In our opinion, the learned
counsel for the respondents are also right in submitting that even if the
statement of land-owners and Port Trust Authorities is believed and it is held
that actual and physical possession of land was handed over by land-owners and
taken over by Port Trust Authorities, it does not change the legal position. It
was not the case of land-owners themselves that proceedings under the Land
Acquisition Act were finalized and award was passed. From the record, it is
clear that no notification under the Land Acquisition Act was issued in 1972.
Such notifications were issued subsequently in the years 1973, 1981, 1991 and
1996. At more than one occasion, notifications were issued only because the
proceedings were not finalized and award was not passed. It is also clear that
in the writ petitions filed by the land-owners in 1994-95, a single Judge of
the High Court directed the authorities to complete land acquisition
proceedings by initiating fresh action commencing from issuance of notification
under Section 4(1) of the Act and to complete them within a period of three
months. In our opinion, therefore, the High Court was right in holding that the
provisions of the Act would apply to the land and Special Officer and Competent
Authority, Urban Land Ceiling was wholly wrong in excluding the land said to
have been in possession of the Port Trust Authorities. We are further of the
view that the State Government, in the facts and circumstances of the case, was
right in exercising revisional jurisdiction under Section 34 of the Act. Mr.
Venugopal is indeed right in submitting that even though no period of
limitation is prescribed for exercise of revisional jurisdiction by the State
Government suo motu, such power must be exercised within a reasonable time
[vide State of Gujarat v. Patel Raghav Natha, (1969) 2 SCC 187].
1996. At more than one occasion, notifications were issued only because the
proceedings were not finalized and award was not passed. It is also clear that
in the writ petitions filed by the land-owners in 1994-95, a single Judge of
the High Court directed the authorities to complete land acquisition
proceedings by initiating fresh action commencing from issuance of notification
under Section 4(1) of the Act and to complete them within a period of three
months. In our opinion, therefore, the High Court was right in holding that the
provisions of the Act would apply to the land and Special Officer and Competent
Authority, Urban Land Ceiling was wholly wrong in excluding the land said to
have been in possession of the Port Trust Authorities. We are further of the
view that the State Government, in the facts and circumstances of the case, was
right in exercising revisional jurisdiction under Section 34 of the Act. Mr.
Venugopal is indeed right in submitting that even though no period of
limitation is prescribed for exercise of revisional jurisdiction by the State
Government suo motu, such power must be exercised within a reasonable time
[vide State of Gujarat v. Patel Raghav Natha, (1969) 2 SCC 187].
But taking
into account the facts and circumstances in their entirety and in particular, a
letter of Chief Engineer, Visakhapatnam Port Trust of December 19, 1985, it
cannot be said that the power had not been exercised within a reasonable
period. It is also pertinent to note that the subsequent development shows as
to how some of the Officers of the Port Trust were parties to fraud said to
have been committed by land-owners. In this connection, the respondents are
right in inviting our attention to a letter dated August 21, 1989 by the Port
Trust Authorities to the Commissioner of Land Reforms stating therein that the
Government intended to exercise suo motu power under Section 34 of the Act but
there was no necessity to reopen proceedings and suitable directions were
required to be issued to District Collector, Visakhapatnam to pass an award in
respect of land sought to be acquired under the Land Acquisition Act. In view
of these developments, in our opinion, the High Court was fully justified in
recalling the earlier order.
into account the facts and circumstances in their entirety and in particular, a
letter of Chief Engineer, Visakhapatnam Port Trust of December 19, 1985, it
cannot be said that the power had not been exercised within a reasonable
period. It is also pertinent to note that the subsequent development shows as
to how some of the Officers of the Port Trust were parties to fraud said to
have been committed by land-owners. In this connection, the respondents are
right in inviting our attention to a letter dated August 21, 1989 by the Port
Trust Authorities to the Commissioner of Land Reforms stating therein that the
Government intended to exercise suo motu power under Section 34 of the Act but
there was no necessity to reopen proceedings and suitable directions were
required to be issued to District Collector, Visakhapatnam to pass an award in
respect of land sought to be acquired under the Land Acquisition Act. In view
of these developments, in our opinion, the High Court was fully justified in
recalling the earlier order.
The High Court has
dealt with the contention regarding fraud said to have been committed by land-
owners in collusion with officers of the respondents. It is stated as to how
the High Court ordered CBI enquiry on prima facie satisfaction that there was a
fraud and report was submitted by Mr. Y. Anil Kumar, IPS, Superintendent of
Police, CBI, Visakhapatnam. In the said report, CBI had stated that possession
was never taken over by the Port Trust Authorities and tenancy cases were
pending. Even if there was transfer of possession, it was in violation of the
Andhra Pradesh Vacant Lands in Urban Areas (Prohibition of Alienation) Act,
1972 which came into force on June 5, 1972. (It may be recalled that according
to the land owners as well as Port Trust Authorities, possession was taken over
by the Port Trust by private negotiations on August 29, 1972). CBI, therefore,
observed that transfer of possession in favour of Port Trust did not constitute
legal transfer under 1972 Act. CBI also noted that proceedings under the Andhra
Pradesh Tenancy Act were pending.
dealt with the contention regarding fraud said to have been committed by land-
owners in collusion with officers of the respondents. It is stated as to how
the High Court ordered CBI enquiry on prima facie satisfaction that there was a
fraud and report was submitted by Mr. Y. Anil Kumar, IPS, Superintendent of
Police, CBI, Visakhapatnam. In the said report, CBI had stated that possession
was never taken over by the Port Trust Authorities and tenancy cases were
pending. Even if there was transfer of possession, it was in violation of the
Andhra Pradesh Vacant Lands in Urban Areas (Prohibition of Alienation) Act,
1972 which came into force on June 5, 1972. (It may be recalled that according
to the land owners as well as Port Trust Authorities, possession was taken over
by the Port Trust by private negotiations on August 29, 1972). CBI, therefore,
observed that transfer of possession in favour of Port Trust did not constitute
legal transfer under 1972 Act. CBI also noted that proceedings under the Andhra
Pradesh Tenancy Act were pending.
Now, it is well settled
principle of law that if any judgment or order is obtained by fraud, it cannot
be said to be a judgment or order in law. Before three centuries, Chief Justice
Edward Coke proclaimed; “Fraud avoids all judicial acts, ecclesiastical or
temporal”.
principle of law that if any judgment or order is obtained by fraud, it cannot
be said to be a judgment or order in law. Before three centuries, Chief Justice
Edward Coke proclaimed; “Fraud avoids all judicial acts, ecclesiastical or
temporal”.
It is thus settled
proposition of law that a judgment, decree or order obtained by playing fraud
on the Court, Tribunal or Authority is a nullity and non est in the eye of law.
Such a judgment, decree or order by the first Court or by the final Court has
to be treated as nullity by every Court, superior or inferior. It can be
challenged in any Court, at any time, in appeal, revision, writ or even in
collateral proceedings. In the leading case of Lazarus Estates Ltd. v. Beasley,
(1956) 1 All ER 341 : (1956) 1 QB 702 : (1956) 2 WLR 502, Lord Denning
observed:
proposition of law that a judgment, decree or order obtained by playing fraud
on the Court, Tribunal or Authority is a nullity and non est in the eye of law.
Such a judgment, decree or order by the first Court or by the final Court has
to be treated as nullity by every Court, superior or inferior. It can be
challenged in any Court, at any time, in appeal, revision, writ or even in
collateral proceedings. In the leading case of Lazarus Estates Ltd. v. Beasley,
(1956) 1 All ER 341 : (1956) 1 QB 702 : (1956) 2 WLR 502, Lord Denning
observed:
“No judgment of a
court, no order of a Minister, can be allowed to stand, if it has been obtained
by fraud.”
court, no order of a Minister, can be allowed to stand, if it has been obtained
by fraud.”
In Duchess of Kingstone,
Smith’s Leading Cases, 13th Edn., p.644, explaining the nature of fraud, de
Grey, C.J. stated that though a judgment would be res judicata and not
impeachable from within, it might be impeachable from without. In other words,
though it is not permissible to show that the court was ‘mistaken’, it might be
shown that it was ‘misled’. There is an essential distinction between mistake
and trickery. The clear implication of the distinction is that an action to set
aside a judgment cannot be brought on the ground that it has been decided
wrongly, namely, that on the merits, the decision was one which should not have
been rendered, but it can be set aside, if the court was imposed upon or
tricked into giving the judgment. It has been said; Fraud and justice never
dwell together (fraus et jus nunquam cohabitant); or fraud and deceit ought to
benefit none (fraus et dolus nemini patrocinari debent).
Smith’s Leading Cases, 13th Edn., p.644, explaining the nature of fraud, de
Grey, C.J. stated that though a judgment would be res judicata and not
impeachable from within, it might be impeachable from without. In other words,
though it is not permissible to show that the court was ‘mistaken’, it might be
shown that it was ‘misled’. There is an essential distinction between mistake
and trickery. The clear implication of the distinction is that an action to set
aside a judgment cannot be brought on the ground that it has been decided
wrongly, namely, that on the merits, the decision was one which should not have
been rendered, but it can be set aside, if the court was imposed upon or
tricked into giving the judgment. It has been said; Fraud and justice never
dwell together (fraus et jus nunquam cohabitant); or fraud and deceit ought to
benefit none (fraus et dolus nemini patrocinari debent).
Fraud may be defined as
an act of deliberate deception with the design of securing some unfair or
undeserved benefit by taking undue advantage of another. In fraud one gains at
the loss of another. Even most solemn proceedings stand vitiated if they are
actuated by fraud. Fraud is thus an extrinsic collateral act which vitiates all
judicial acts, whether in rem or in personam. The principle of ‘finality of
litigation’ cannot be stretched to the extent of an absurdity that it can be
utilized as an engine of oppression by dishonest and fraudulent litigants.
an act of deliberate deception with the design of securing some unfair or
undeserved benefit by taking undue advantage of another. In fraud one gains at
the loss of another. Even most solemn proceedings stand vitiated if they are
actuated by fraud. Fraud is thus an extrinsic collateral act which vitiates all
judicial acts, whether in rem or in personam. The principle of ‘finality of
litigation’ cannot be stretched to the extent of an absurdity that it can be
utilized as an engine of oppression by dishonest and fraudulent litigants.
In S.P. Chengalvaraya
Naidu (dead) by LRs. V. Jagannath (dead) by LRs. & Ors. (1994) 1 SCC 1 : JT
1994 (6) SC 331, this Court had an occasion to consider the doctrine of fraud
and the effect thereof on the judgment obtained by a party. In that case, one A
by a registered deed, relinquished all his rights in the suit property in
favour of C who sold the property to B. Without disclosing that fact, A filed a
suit for possession against B and obtained preliminary decree. During the
pendency of an application for final decree, B came to know about the fact of
release deed by A in favour of C. He, therefore, contended that the decree was
obtained by playing fraud on the court and was a nullity. The trial court
upheld the contention and dismissed the application. The High Court, however,
set aside the order of the trial court, observing that “there was no legal
duty cast upon the plaintiff to come to court with a true case and prove it by
true evidence”. B approached this Court.
Naidu (dead) by LRs. V. Jagannath (dead) by LRs. & Ors. (1994) 1 SCC 1 : JT
1994 (6) SC 331, this Court had an occasion to consider the doctrine of fraud
and the effect thereof on the judgment obtained by a party. In that case, one A
by a registered deed, relinquished all his rights in the suit property in
favour of C who sold the property to B. Without disclosing that fact, A filed a
suit for possession against B and obtained preliminary decree. During the
pendency of an application for final decree, B came to know about the fact of
release deed by A in favour of C. He, therefore, contended that the decree was
obtained by playing fraud on the court and was a nullity. The trial court
upheld the contention and dismissed the application. The High Court, however,
set aside the order of the trial court, observing that “there was no legal
duty cast upon the plaintiff to come to court with a true case and prove it by
true evidence”. B approached this Court.
Allowing the appeal, setting
aside the judgment of the High Court and describing the observations of the
High Court as ‘wholly perverse’, Kuldip Singh, J. stated: “The courts of
law are meant for imparting justice between the parties. One who comes to the
court, must come with clean-hands. We are constrained to say that more often
than not, process of the court is being abused. Property-grabbers, tax-
evaders, bank-loan- dodgers and other unscrupulous persons from all walks of
life find the court – process a convenient lever to retain the illegal-gains
indefinitely. We have no hesitation to say that a person, who’s case is based
on falsehood, has no right to approach the court. He can be summarily thrown
out at any stage of the litigation”.
aside the judgment of the High Court and describing the observations of the
High Court as ‘wholly perverse’, Kuldip Singh, J. stated: “The courts of
law are meant for imparting justice between the parties. One who comes to the
court, must come with clean-hands. We are constrained to say that more often
than not, process of the court is being abused. Property-grabbers, tax-
evaders, bank-loan- dodgers and other unscrupulous persons from all walks of
life find the court – process a convenient lever to retain the illegal-gains
indefinitely. We have no hesitation to say that a person, who’s case is based
on falsehood, has no right to approach the court. He can be summarily thrown
out at any stage of the litigation”.
(emphasis supplied) The
Court proceeded to state: “A litigant, who approaches the court, is bound
to produce all the documents executed by him which are relevant to the
litigation. If he withholds a vital document in order to gain advantage on the
other side then he would he guilty of playing fraud on the court as well as on
the opposite party”.
Court proceeded to state: “A litigant, who approaches the court, is bound
to produce all the documents executed by him which are relevant to the
litigation. If he withholds a vital document in order to gain advantage on the
other side then he would he guilty of playing fraud on the court as well as on
the opposite party”.
The Court concluded:
“The principle of ‘finality of litigation’ cannot be pressed to the extent
of such an absurdity that it becomes an engine of fraud in the hands of
dishonest litigants”.
“The principle of ‘finality of litigation’ cannot be pressed to the extent
of such an absurdity that it becomes an engine of fraud in the hands of
dishonest litigants”.
In Indian Bank v.
Satyam Fibres (India) Pvt. Ltd., (1996) 5 SCC 550 : JT 1996 (7) SC 135,
referring to Lazarus Estates and Smith v. East Elloe Rural District Council,
1956 AC 336 : (1956) 1 All ER 855 : (1956) 2 WLR 888, this Court stated;
Satyam Fibres (India) Pvt. Ltd., (1996) 5 SCC 550 : JT 1996 (7) SC 135,
referring to Lazarus Estates and Smith v. East Elloe Rural District Council,
1956 AC 336 : (1956) 1 All ER 855 : (1956) 2 WLR 888, this Court stated;
“The judiciary in
India also possesses inherent power, specially under Section 151 C.P.C., to
recall its judgment or order if it is obtained by Fraud on Court. In the case
of fraud on a party to the suit or proceedings, the Court may direct the
affected party to file a separate suit for setting aside the Decree obtained by
fraud. Inherent powers are powers which are resident in all courts, especially
of superior jurisdiction. These powers spring not from legislation but from the
nature and the Constitution of the Tribunals or Courts themselves so as to
enable them to maintain their dignity, secure obedience to its process and
rules, protect its officers from indignity and wrong and to punish unseemly
behaviour. This power is necessary for the orderly administration of the
Court’s business”.
India also possesses inherent power, specially under Section 151 C.P.C., to
recall its judgment or order if it is obtained by Fraud on Court. In the case
of fraud on a party to the suit or proceedings, the Court may direct the
affected party to file a separate suit for setting aside the Decree obtained by
fraud. Inherent powers are powers which are resident in all courts, especially
of superior jurisdiction. These powers spring not from legislation but from the
nature and the Constitution of the Tribunals or Courts themselves so as to
enable them to maintain their dignity, secure obedience to its process and
rules, protect its officers from indignity and wrong and to punish unseemly
behaviour. This power is necessary for the orderly administration of the
Court’s business”.
(emphasis supplied) In
United India Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Rajendra Singh & Ors., (2000) 3 SCC 581
: JT 2000 (3) SC 151, by practising fraud upon the Insurance Company, the
claimant obtained an award of compensation from the Motor Accident Claims
Tribunal. On coming to know of fraud, the Insurance Company applied for
recalling of the award. The Tribunal, however, dismissed the petition on the
ground that it had no power to review its own award. The High Court confirmed
the order. The Company approached this Court.
United India Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Rajendra Singh & Ors., (2000) 3 SCC 581
: JT 2000 (3) SC 151, by practising fraud upon the Insurance Company, the
claimant obtained an award of compensation from the Motor Accident Claims
Tribunal. On coming to know of fraud, the Insurance Company applied for
recalling of the award. The Tribunal, however, dismissed the petition on the
ground that it had no power to review its own award. The High Court confirmed
the order. The Company approached this Court.
Allowing the appeal and
setting aside the orders, this Court stated;
setting aside the orders, this Court stated;
“It is unrealistic
to expect the appellant company to resist a claim at the first instance on the
basis of the fraud because appellant company had at that stage no knowledge
about the fraud allegedly played by the claimants. If the Insurance Company
comes to know of any dubious concoction having been made with the sinister
object of extracting a claim for compensation, and if by that time the award
was already passed, it would not be possible for the company to file a
statutory appeal against the award. Not only because of bar of limitation to
file the appeal but the consideration of the appeal even if the delay could be
condoned, would be limited to the issues formulated from the pleadings made
till then.
to expect the appellant company to resist a claim at the first instance on the
basis of the fraud because appellant company had at that stage no knowledge
about the fraud allegedly played by the claimants. If the Insurance Company
comes to know of any dubious concoction having been made with the sinister
object of extracting a claim for compensation, and if by that time the award
was already passed, it would not be possible for the company to file a
statutory appeal against the award. Not only because of bar of limitation to
file the appeal but the consideration of the appeal even if the delay could be
condoned, would be limited to the issues formulated from the pleadings made
till then.
Therefore, we have no
doubt that the remedy to move for recalling the order on the basis of the newly
discovered facts amounting to fraud of high degree, cannot be foreclosed in
such a situation. No Court or tribunal can be regarded as powerless to recall
its own order if it is convinced that the order was wangled through fraud or
misrepresentation of such a dimension as would affect the very basis of the
claim.
doubt that the remedy to move for recalling the order on the basis of the newly
discovered facts amounting to fraud of high degree, cannot be foreclosed in
such a situation. No Court or tribunal can be regarded as powerless to recall
its own order if it is convinced that the order was wangled through fraud or
misrepresentation of such a dimension as would affect the very basis of the
claim.
The allegation made by
the appellant Insurance Company, that claimants were not involved in the
accident which they described in the claim petitions, cannot be brushed aside
without further probe into the matter, for, the said allegation has not been
specifically denied by the claimants when they were called upon to file objections
to the applications for recalling of the awards. Claimants then confined their
resistance to the plea that the application for recall is not legally
maintainable. Therefore, we strongly feel that the claim must be allowed to be
resisted, on the ground of fraud now alleged by the Insurance Company. If we
fail to afford to the Insurance Company an opportunity to substantiate their
contentions it might certainly lead to serious miscarriage of justice”.
the appellant Insurance Company, that claimants were not involved in the
accident which they described in the claim petitions, cannot be brushed aside
without further probe into the matter, for, the said allegation has not been
specifically denied by the claimants when they were called upon to file objections
to the applications for recalling of the awards. Claimants then confined their
resistance to the plea that the application for recall is not legally
maintainable. Therefore, we strongly feel that the claim must be allowed to be
resisted, on the ground of fraud now alleged by the Insurance Company. If we
fail to afford to the Insurance Company an opportunity to substantiate their
contentions it might certainly lead to serious miscarriage of justice”.
(emphasis supplied) Mr.
Venugopal, no doubt, contended that when the order passed by the earlier
Division Bench was not interfered with by this Court and SLPs were dismissed,
it was not open to the High Court thereafter to entertain recall-applications
and grant the relief of recalling of earlier orders. According to him, such an
exercise of power was unlawful and abuse of process of law. In this connection,
our attention has been invited by the learned counsel to a decision of this
Court in Abbai Maligai Partnership Firm & Anr. v. K. Santhakumaran &
Ors., (1998) 7 SCC 386 : JT 1998 (6) SC 396. In that case, after dismissal of
Special Leave Petition by this Court, review petition was entertained by the
High Court and earlier judgment was recalled. When the matter reached this
Court, setting aside the order passed by the High Court, the Court observed:
“The manner in which the learned Single Judge of the High Court exercised
the review jurisdiction, after the special leave petitions against the
self-same order had been dismissed by this court after hearing learned counsel
for the parties, to say the least, was not proper.
Venugopal, no doubt, contended that when the order passed by the earlier
Division Bench was not interfered with by this Court and SLPs were dismissed,
it was not open to the High Court thereafter to entertain recall-applications
and grant the relief of recalling of earlier orders. According to him, such an
exercise of power was unlawful and abuse of process of law. In this connection,
our attention has been invited by the learned counsel to a decision of this
Court in Abbai Maligai Partnership Firm & Anr. v. K. Santhakumaran &
Ors., (1998) 7 SCC 386 : JT 1998 (6) SC 396. In that case, after dismissal of
Special Leave Petition by this Court, review petition was entertained by the
High Court and earlier judgment was recalled. When the matter reached this
Court, setting aside the order passed by the High Court, the Court observed:
“The manner in which the learned Single Judge of the High Court exercised
the review jurisdiction, after the special leave petitions against the
self-same order had been dismissed by this court after hearing learned counsel
for the parties, to say the least, was not proper.
Interference by the learned
single Judge at that stage is subversive of judicial discipline. The High Court
was aware that SLPs against the orders dated 7.1.87 had already been dismissed
by this court. This High Court, therefore, had no power or jurisdiction to
review the self same order, which was the subject matter of challenge in the
SLPs in this court after the challenge had failed. By passing the impugned
order on 7.4.1994, judicial propriety has been sacrificed. After the dismissal
of the special leave petitions by this court, on contest, no review petitions
could be entertained by the High Court against the same order. The very
entertainment of the review petitions, in the facts and circumstances of the
case was an affront to the order of this Court. We express our strong
disapproval and hope there would be no occasion in the future when we may have
to say so.
single Judge at that stage is subversive of judicial discipline. The High Court
was aware that SLPs against the orders dated 7.1.87 had already been dismissed
by this court. This High Court, therefore, had no power or jurisdiction to
review the self same order, which was the subject matter of challenge in the
SLPs in this court after the challenge had failed. By passing the impugned
order on 7.4.1994, judicial propriety has been sacrificed. After the dismissal
of the special leave petitions by this court, on contest, no review petitions
could be entertained by the High Court against the same order. The very
entertainment of the review petitions, in the facts and circumstances of the
case was an affront to the order of this Court. We express our strong
disapproval and hope there would be no occasion in the future when we may have
to say so.
The jurisdiction exercised by the High Court, under the
circumstances, was palpably erroneous. The respondents who approached the High
Court after the dismissal of their SLPs by this court, abused the process of
the court and indulged in vexatious litigation. We strongly depricate the
manner in which the review petitions were filed and heard in the High Court
after the dismissal of the SLPs by this court.” (emphasis supplied) The
respondents, on the other hand, placed reliance upon Kunhayammed & Ors. v.
State of Kerala & Anr., (2000) 6 SCC 359 : JT 2000 (9) SC 110, wherein this
Court had an occasion to consider the application of the doctrine of merger to
orders passed by this Court while exercising jurisdiction under Article 136 of
the Constitution.
circumstances, was palpably erroneous. The respondents who approached the High
Court after the dismissal of their SLPs by this court, abused the process of
the court and indulged in vexatious litigation. We strongly depricate the
manner in which the review petitions were filed and heard in the High Court
after the dismissal of the SLPs by this court.” (emphasis supplied) The
respondents, on the other hand, placed reliance upon Kunhayammed & Ors. v.
State of Kerala & Anr., (2000) 6 SCC 359 : JT 2000 (9) SC 110, wherein this
Court had an occasion to consider the application of the doctrine of merger to
orders passed by this Court while exercising jurisdiction under Article 136 of
the Constitution.
The Court there observed that exercise of jurisdiction by
this Court under Article 136 is in two stages; (i) granting of a special leave
to appeal; and (ii) hearing of appeal. The Court went on to observe that the
doctrine of merger does not apply to first stage i.e. at the stage of granting
of special leave to appeal. It applies only at the second stage of hearing of
appeals. The Court in the light of above position, laid down the following
principles:
this Court under Article 136 is in two stages; (i) granting of a special leave
to appeal; and (ii) hearing of appeal. The Court went on to observe that the
doctrine of merger does not apply to first stage i.e. at the stage of granting
of special leave to appeal. It applies only at the second stage of hearing of
appeals. The Court in the light of above position, laid down the following
principles:
(i) Where an appeal or
revision is provided against an order passed by a court, tribunal or any other
authority before superior forum and such superior forum modifies, reverses or
affirms the decision put in issue before it, the decision by the subordinate
forum merges in the decision by the superior forum and it is the latter which
subsists, remains operative and is capable of enforcement in the eye of law.
revision is provided against an order passed by a court, tribunal or any other
authority before superior forum and such superior forum modifies, reverses or
affirms the decision put in issue before it, the decision by the subordinate
forum merges in the decision by the superior forum and it is the latter which
subsists, remains operative and is capable of enforcement in the eye of law.
(ii) The jurisdiction
conferred by Article 136 of the Constitution is divisible into two stages.
First stage is upto the disposal of prayer for special leave to file an appeal.
The second stage commences if and when the leave to appeal is granted and
special leave petition is converted into an appeal.
conferred by Article 136 of the Constitution is divisible into two stages.
First stage is upto the disposal of prayer for special leave to file an appeal.
The second stage commences if and when the leave to appeal is granted and
special leave petition is converted into an appeal.
(iii) Doctrine of
merger is not a doctrine of universal or unlimited application. It will depend
on the nature of jurisdiction exercised by the superior forum and the content
or subject-matter of challenge laid or capable of being laid shall be
determinative of the applicability of merger. The superior jurisdiction should
be capable of reversing, modifying or affirming the order put in issue before
it. Under Article 136 of the Constitution the Supreme Court may reverse, modify
or affirm the judgment-decree or order appealed against while exercising its
appellate jurisdiction and not while exercising the discretionary jurisdiction
disposing of petition for special leave to appeal. The doctrine of merger can
therefore be applied to the former and not to the latter.
merger is not a doctrine of universal or unlimited application. It will depend
on the nature of jurisdiction exercised by the superior forum and the content
or subject-matter of challenge laid or capable of being laid shall be
determinative of the applicability of merger. The superior jurisdiction should
be capable of reversing, modifying or affirming the order put in issue before
it. Under Article 136 of the Constitution the Supreme Court may reverse, modify
or affirm the judgment-decree or order appealed against while exercising its
appellate jurisdiction and not while exercising the discretionary jurisdiction
disposing of petition for special leave to appeal. The doctrine of merger can
therefore be applied to the former and not to the latter.
(iv) An order refusing
special leave to appeal may be a non-speaking order or a speaking one. In
either case it does not attract the doctrine of merger. An order refusing
special leave to appeal does not stand substituted in place of the order under
challenge. All that it means is that the Court was not inclined to exercise its
discretion so as to allow the appeal being filed.
special leave to appeal may be a non-speaking order or a speaking one. In
either case it does not attract the doctrine of merger. An order refusing
special leave to appeal does not stand substituted in place of the order under
challenge. All that it means is that the Court was not inclined to exercise its
discretion so as to allow the appeal being filed.
(v) If the order
refusing leave to appeal is a speaking order, i.e. gives reasons for refusing
the grant of leave, then the order has two implications. Firstly, the statement
of law contained in the order is a declaration of law by the Supreme Court
within the meaning of Article 141 of the Constitution. Secondly, other than the
declaration of law, whatever is stated in the order are the findings recorded
by the Supreme Court which would bind the parties thereto and also the court,
tribunal or authority in any proceedings subsequent thereto by way of judicial
discipline, the Supreme Court being the apex court of the country. But, this does
not amount to saying that the order of the court, tribunal or authority below
has stood merged in the order of the Supreme Court rejecting special leave
petition or that the order of the Supreme Court is the only order binding as
res judicata in subsequent proceedings between the parties,
refusing leave to appeal is a speaking order, i.e. gives reasons for refusing
the grant of leave, then the order has two implications. Firstly, the statement
of law contained in the order is a declaration of law by the Supreme Court
within the meaning of Article 141 of the Constitution. Secondly, other than the
declaration of law, whatever is stated in the order are the findings recorded
by the Supreme Court which would bind the parties thereto and also the court,
tribunal or authority in any proceedings subsequent thereto by way of judicial
discipline, the Supreme Court being the apex court of the country. But, this does
not amount to saying that the order of the court, tribunal or authority below
has stood merged in the order of the Supreme Court rejecting special leave
petition or that the order of the Supreme Court is the only order binding as
res judicata in subsequent proceedings between the parties,
(vi) Once leave to
appeal has been granted and appellate jurisdiction of Supreme Court has been
invoked the order passed in appeal would attract the doctrine of merger; the
order may be of reversal, modification or merely affirmation.
appeal has been granted and appellate jurisdiction of Supreme Court has been
invoked the order passed in appeal would attract the doctrine of merger; the
order may be of reversal, modification or merely affirmation.
(vii) On an appeal
having been preferred or a petition seeking leave to appeal having been
converted into an appeal before Supreme Court the jurisdiction of High Court to
entertain a review petition is lost thereafter as provided by Sub-rule (1) of
Rule (1) of Order 47 of the C.P.C.
having been preferred or a petition seeking leave to appeal having been
converted into an appeal before Supreme Court the jurisdiction of High Court to
entertain a review petition is lost thereafter as provided by Sub-rule (1) of
Rule (1) of Order 47 of the C.P.C.
In Kunhayammed, Abbai
Maligai was considered and it was observed that in the facts and circumstances
of that case, this Court did not approve the order passed by the High Court.
The Court noted that in Abbai Maligai, this Court did not consider the doctrine
of merger. According to the Court, a careful reading of Abbai Maligai
“brings out the correct statement of law and fortifies us in taking the
view” as taken. [see also S. Shanmugavel Nadar v. State of T.N. &
Anr., (2002) 8 SCC 361 : JT 2002 (7) SCC 568].
Maligai was considered and it was observed that in the facts and circumstances
of that case, this Court did not approve the order passed by the High Court.
The Court noted that in Abbai Maligai, this Court did not consider the doctrine
of merger. According to the Court, a careful reading of Abbai Maligai
“brings out the correct statement of law and fortifies us in taking the
view” as taken. [see also S. Shanmugavel Nadar v. State of T.N. &
Anr., (2002) 8 SCC 361 : JT 2002 (7) SCC 568].
The matter can be
looked at from a different angle as well. Suppose, a case is decided by a
competent Court of Law after hearing the parties and an order is passed in
favour of the applicant/plaintiff which is upheld by all the courts including
the final Court. Let us also think of a case where this Court does not dismiss
Special Leave Petition but after granting leave decides the appeal finally by
recording reasons. Such order can truly be said to be a judgment to which
Article 141 of the Constitution applies. Likewise, the doctrine of merger also
gets attracted. All orders passed by the courts/authorities below, therefore,
merge in the judgment of this Court and after such judgment, it is not open to
any party to the judgment to approach any court or authority to review, recall
or reconsider the order.
looked at from a different angle as well. Suppose, a case is decided by a
competent Court of Law after hearing the parties and an order is passed in
favour of the applicant/plaintiff which is upheld by all the courts including
the final Court. Let us also think of a case where this Court does not dismiss
Special Leave Petition but after granting leave decides the appeal finally by
recording reasons. Such order can truly be said to be a judgment to which
Article 141 of the Constitution applies. Likewise, the doctrine of merger also
gets attracted. All orders passed by the courts/authorities below, therefore,
merge in the judgment of this Court and after such judgment, it is not open to
any party to the judgment to approach any court or authority to review, recall
or reconsider the order.
The above principle, however, is subject to exception
of fraud. Once it is established that the order was obtained by a successful
party by practising or playing fraud, it is vitiated. Such order cannot be held
legal, valid or in consonance with law. It is non-existent and non est and
cannot be allowed to stand. This is the fundamental principle of law and needs
no further elaboration. Therefore, it has been said that a judgment, decree or
order obtained by fraud has to be treated as nullity, whether by the court of
first instance or by the final court. And it has to be treated as non est by
every Court, superior or inferior.
of fraud. Once it is established that the order was obtained by a successful
party by practising or playing fraud, it is vitiated. Such order cannot be held
legal, valid or in consonance with law. It is non-existent and non est and
cannot be allowed to stand. This is the fundamental principle of law and needs
no further elaboration. Therefore, it has been said that a judgment, decree or
order obtained by fraud has to be treated as nullity, whether by the court of
first instance or by the final court. And it has to be treated as non est by
every Court, superior or inferior.
Hence, the argument of
Mr. Venugopal cannot be upheld. Even if he is right in submitting that after
dismissal of SLPs, the respondent herein could not have approached the High
Court for recalling its earlier order passed in April, 2000 and the High Court
could not have entertained such applications, nor the recalling could have been
done, in the facts and circumstances of the case and in the light of the
finding by the High Court that fraud was committed by the land-owners in
collusion with the officers of the Port Trust Authorities and Government, in
our considered view, no fault can be found against the approach adopted by the
High Court and the decision taken. The High Court, in our opinion, rightly
recalled the order, dated April 27, 2000 and remanded the case to the
authorities to decide the same afresh in accordance with law.
Mr. Venugopal cannot be upheld. Even if he is right in submitting that after
dismissal of SLPs, the respondent herein could not have approached the High
Court for recalling its earlier order passed in April, 2000 and the High Court
could not have entertained such applications, nor the recalling could have been
done, in the facts and circumstances of the case and in the light of the
finding by the High Court that fraud was committed by the land-owners in
collusion with the officers of the Port Trust Authorities and Government, in
our considered view, no fault can be found against the approach adopted by the
High Court and the decision taken. The High Court, in our opinion, rightly
recalled the order, dated April 27, 2000 and remanded the case to the
authorities to decide the same afresh in accordance with law.
Mr. Venugopal also
submitted that the Division Bench of the High Court in an order dated April 27,
2000 observed that the land being a garden land having fruit bearing trees
which had been cultivated by a tenant, it did not fall within the description
of ‘urban land’ or ‘vacant land’ within the meaning of Section 2(o) or 2(q) of
the Ceiling Act and the said aspect had not been gone into at all by the State
Government. The High Court thereafter considered the provisions of the Ceiling
Act and held that the land was agricultural land and required to be excluded
from the operation of the Ceiling Act.
submitted that the Division Bench of the High Court in an order dated April 27,
2000 observed that the land being a garden land having fruit bearing trees
which had been cultivated by a tenant, it did not fall within the description
of ‘urban land’ or ‘vacant land’ within the meaning of Section 2(o) or 2(q) of
the Ceiling Act and the said aspect had not been gone into at all by the State
Government. The High Court thereafter considered the provisions of the Ceiling
Act and held that the land was agricultural land and required to be excluded
from the operation of the Ceiling Act.
As to the above, we may
only observe that it was never the case of land-owners while filling a form
under Section 6 of the Act that the provisions of the Act were not applicable
to the land in question because the land was used for agriculture or
horticulture purposes or that it was having fruit bearing trees. The exclusion
or non- operation of the Act was sought only on the ground that the possession
of the land had already been handed over to Port Trust Authorities in 1972 and
hence the land cannot become subject matter of the Ceiling Act. In view of the
above fact, in our opinion, the High Court was right in passing the impugned
order directing the authorities to consider all aspects and pass an appropriate
order in accordance with law. Last but not the least. We are exercising
jurisdiction under Article 136 of the Constitution.
only observe that it was never the case of land-owners while filling a form
under Section 6 of the Act that the provisions of the Act were not applicable
to the land in question because the land was used for agriculture or
horticulture purposes or that it was having fruit bearing trees. The exclusion
or non- operation of the Act was sought only on the ground that the possession
of the land had already been handed over to Port Trust Authorities in 1972 and
hence the land cannot become subject matter of the Ceiling Act. In view of the
above fact, in our opinion, the High Court was right in passing the impugned
order directing the authorities to consider all aspects and pass an appropriate
order in accordance with law. Last but not the least. We are exercising
jurisdiction under Article 136 of the Constitution.
It is discretionary and
equitable in nature.? Clause (1) of the said Article confers very wide and
extensive powers on this Court to grant special leave to appeal against any
judgment, decree, determination, sentence or order in any cause or matter
passed or made by any Court or Tribunal in India. The Article commences with a
non- obstante clause, “Notwithstanding anything in this Chapter”
(i.e. Chapter IV of Part V). These words are of overriding effect and clearly
indicate the intention of the Framers of the Constitution that it is a special
jurisdiction and a residuary power unfettered by any statute or other
provisions of Chapter IV of Part V of the Constitution. It is extraordinary in
its amplitude. Its limit, when it chases injustice, is the sky. Such power,
therefore, may be exercised by this Court whenever and wherever justice demands
intervention by the highest Court of the country.
equitable in nature.? Clause (1) of the said Article confers very wide and
extensive powers on this Court to grant special leave to appeal against any
judgment, decree, determination, sentence or order in any cause or matter
passed or made by any Court or Tribunal in India. The Article commences with a
non- obstante clause, “Notwithstanding anything in this Chapter”
(i.e. Chapter IV of Part V). These words are of overriding effect and clearly
indicate the intention of the Framers of the Constitution that it is a special
jurisdiction and a residuary power unfettered by any statute or other
provisions of Chapter IV of Part V of the Constitution. It is extraordinary in
its amplitude. Its limit, when it chases injustice, is the sky. Such power,
therefore, may be exercised by this Court whenever and wherever justice demands
intervention by the highest Court of the country.
Article 136, however,
does not confer a right of appeal on any party. It confers discretion on this
Court to grant leave to appeal in appropriate cases. In other words, the
Constitution has not made the Supreme Court a regular Court of Appeal or a
Court of Error. This Court only intervenes where justice, equity and good
conscience require such intervention. In Baiganna v. Deputy Collector of
Consolidation, (1978) 2 SCR 509 : (1978) 2 SCC 461; Krishna Iyer, J. pithily
stated;
does not confer a right of appeal on any party. It confers discretion on this
Court to grant leave to appeal in appropriate cases. In other words, the
Constitution has not made the Supreme Court a regular Court of Appeal or a
Court of Error. This Court only intervenes where justice, equity and good
conscience require such intervention. In Baiganna v. Deputy Collector of
Consolidation, (1978) 2 SCR 509 : (1978) 2 SCC 461; Krishna Iyer, J. pithily
stated;
“The Supreme Court
is more than a Court of appeal. It exercises power only when there is supreme
need. It is not the fifth court of appeal but the final court of the nation.
Therefore, even if legal flaws may be electronically detected, we cannot
interfere sans manifest injustice or substantial question of public
importance”.
is more than a Court of appeal. It exercises power only when there is supreme
need. It is not the fifth court of appeal but the final court of the nation.
Therefore, even if legal flaws may be electronically detected, we cannot
interfere sans manifest injustice or substantial question of public
importance”.
(emphasis supplied)
[see also V.G. Ramachandran, ‘Law of Writs’; Revised by Justice C.K. Thakker
& Mrs. M.C. Thakker; Sixth Edn; Vol.2; pp.1440-1528] Keeping in view
totality of facts and attending circumstances including serious allegations of
fraud said to have been committed by the land-owners in collusion with officers
of the respondent-Port Trust and Government, report submitted by the Central
Bureau of Investigation (CBI), prima facie showing commission of fraud and
initiation of criminal proceedings, etc. if the High Court was pleased to
recall the earlier order by issuing directions to the authorities to pass an appropriate
order afresh in accordance with law, it cannot be said that there is
miscarriage of justice which calls for interference in exercise of
discretionary and equitable jurisdiction of this Court. We, therefore, hold
that this is not a fit case which calls for our intervention under Article 136
of the Constitution. We, therefore, decline to do so.
[see also V.G. Ramachandran, ‘Law of Writs’; Revised by Justice C.K. Thakker
& Mrs. M.C. Thakker; Sixth Edn; Vol.2; pp.1440-1528] Keeping in view
totality of facts and attending circumstances including serious allegations of
fraud said to have been committed by the land-owners in collusion with officers
of the respondent-Port Trust and Government, report submitted by the Central
Bureau of Investigation (CBI), prima facie showing commission of fraud and
initiation of criminal proceedings, etc. if the High Court was pleased to
recall the earlier order by issuing directions to the authorities to pass an appropriate
order afresh in accordance with law, it cannot be said that there is
miscarriage of justice which calls for interference in exercise of
discretionary and equitable jurisdiction of this Court. We, therefore, hold
that this is not a fit case which calls for our intervention under Article 136
of the Constitution. We, therefore, decline to do so.
Before parting with the
matter, we may state that all the observations made by us hereinabove have been
made only for the purpose of deciding the legality and validity of the order
passed by the High Court. We may clarify that we may not be understood to have
expressed any opinion on merits of the matter one way or the other. Therefore,
as and when the matter will be considered by the authorities in pursuance of
the directions of the High Court, it will be decided on its own merits without
being inhibited by the observations made by us in this judgment.
matter, we may state that all the observations made by us hereinabove have been
made only for the purpose of deciding the legality and validity of the order
passed by the High Court. We may clarify that we may not be understood to have
expressed any opinion on merits of the matter one way or the other. Therefore,
as and when the matter will be considered by the authorities in pursuance of
the directions of the High Court, it will be decided on its own merits without
being inhibited by the observations made by us in this judgment.
For the foregoing
reasons, the appeals deserve to be dismissed and are accordingly dismissed with
costs.
reasons, the appeals deserve to be dismissed and are accordingly dismissed with
costs.