DELHI HIGH COURT
SUKHBIRI DEVI & ORS. VS. UOI
& ORS.
& ORS.
DATED : 25.08.2009
Summarised
Judgement (Scroll for Complete Judgement)
Judgement (Scroll for Complete Judgement)
Introduction :
The appellants (hereinafter referred to
as plaintiffs) filed a suit for declaration with consequential relief of
injunction against the respondents (hereinafter referred to as defendants)
seeking decree of declaration declaring that plaintiffs are the co- owners in
the allotment of the suit.
as plaintiffs) filed a suit for declaration with consequential relief of
injunction against the respondents (hereinafter referred to as defendants)
seeking decree of declaration declaring that plaintiffs are the co- owners in
the allotment of the suit.
Following substantial question of law
was formulated on 3.8.2009:-
was formulated on 3.8.2009:-
“Whether the trial court rightly
construed the provision of Limitation Act while coming to the conclusion that
the suit was barred by limitation and also the date from which the cause of
action is alleged to have accrue in favour of plaintiff while considering the
issue of limitation.”
construed the provision of Limitation Act while coming to the conclusion that
the suit was barred by limitation and also the date from which the cause of
action is alleged to have accrue in favour of plaintiff while considering the
issue of limitation.”
It is submitted by the learned counsel
that draw of lots is the consequence of recommendation and allotment on the
basis of relinquishment deed and plaintiffs cannot question the draw of lots
unless the relinquishment deed, recommendation, sanction and allotment made in
the year 1991 and 1994 are declared null and void. Therefore, apparently the
relief of declaration as claimed by the plaintiffs is barred by period of
limitation.
that draw of lots is the consequence of recommendation and allotment on the
basis of relinquishment deed and plaintiffs cannot question the draw of lots
unless the relinquishment deed, recommendation, sanction and allotment made in
the year 1991 and 1994 are declared null and void. Therefore, apparently the
relief of declaration as claimed by the plaintiffs is barred by period of
limitation.
Observation
of Court:
of Court:
This letter was addressed to defendant
No.5 by Land and Building Department regarding allotment of alternative plot.
Thereafter Nahar Singh wrote an objection letter dated 5.4.1991 to DDA and Land
and Building Department. He died on 14.5.1993. Plaintiff No. 1 also filed an
objection application addressed to Joint Secretary Land and Building on
9.5.1995, 16.9.1998, 3.8.1999 and thereafter.
No.5 by Land and Building Department regarding allotment of alternative plot.
Thereafter Nahar Singh wrote an objection letter dated 5.4.1991 to DDA and Land
and Building Department. He died on 14.5.1993. Plaintiff No. 1 also filed an
objection application addressed to Joint Secretary Land and Building on
9.5.1995, 16.9.1998, 3.8.1999 and thereafter.
Therefore, I conclude that the trial
court rightly construed the provisions of Limitation Act while coming to the
conclusion that the suit was barred by period of limitation and also the date
on which the cause of action accrued in favour of the plaintiffs while
considering the issue of limitation.
court rightly construed the provisions of Limitation Act while coming to the
conclusion that the suit was barred by period of limitation and also the date
on which the cause of action accrued in favour of the plaintiffs while
considering the issue of limitation.
Judgement
:
:
Hence, I find no merits in the appeal
and the same is accordingly dismissed.
and the same is accordingly dismissed.
—————————————————
DELHI HIGH COURT
SUKHBIRI DEVI & ORS. VS. UOI & ORS.
DATED : 25.08.2009
Author : Aruna Suresh
HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
RSA 79/2007 & CM No. 3931/2007
Judgment reserved on :
August 03, 2009
August 03, 2009
Date of decision : August
25, 2009
25, 2009
SUKHBIRI DEVI & ORS. ….. Appellant
Through : Mr. J.C. Mahindroo,
Advocate
Advocate
Versus
UOI & ORS. …..Respondents
Through : Mr. S.D. Singh,
Advocate for defendant No. 5.
Advocate for defendant No. 5.
Mr. Pawan Mathur, Adv.
for DDA.
for DDA.
CORAM : HON’BLE MS. JUSTICE ARUNA SURESH
(1) Whether reporters of local paper may
be
be
allowed to see the judgment?
(2) To be referred to the reporter or
not? Yes
not? Yes
(3) Whether the judgment should be
reported
reported
in the Digest ? Yes
JUDGMENT ARUNA SURESH, J.
1. The appellants
(hereinafter referred to as plaintiffs) filed a suit for declaration with
consequential relief of injunction against the respondents (hereinafter
referred to as defendants) seeking decree of declaration declaring that
plaintiffs are the co- owners in the allotment of the suit plot No.13, Type
A-1, Sector-26, Rohini, New Delhi and that defendant No. 5 is not the exclusive
owner of the said plot in suit. Plaintiffs further sought relief for permanent
injunction seeking restraint order against the defendant No.5 from selling,
conveying, transferring or alienating the said plot to anyone whosoever and for
restraining defendants No.1 to 4 from delivering the physical possession and
the titles of the said plot to defendant No.5 or his nominee. The said suit was
dismissed by the trial court vide its judgment and decree dated 13.5.2005.
Against this order, plaintiffs filed first regular appeal before the Additional
District Judge. The said appeal was dismissed by the appellate court vide its
judgment dated 8.12.2006. Aggrieved by the judgment of the first appellate
court, the second appeal has been filed by the plaintiffs under Section 100 of
the Civil Procedure Code (hereinafter referred to as CPC).
(hereinafter referred to as plaintiffs) filed a suit for declaration with
consequential relief of injunction against the respondents (hereinafter
referred to as defendants) seeking decree of declaration declaring that
plaintiffs are the co- owners in the allotment of the suit plot No.13, Type
A-1, Sector-26, Rohini, New Delhi and that defendant No. 5 is not the exclusive
owner of the said plot in suit. Plaintiffs further sought relief for permanent
injunction seeking restraint order against the defendant No.5 from selling,
conveying, transferring or alienating the said plot to anyone whosoever and for
restraining defendants No.1 to 4 from delivering the physical possession and
the titles of the said plot to defendant No.5 or his nominee. The said suit was
dismissed by the trial court vide its judgment and decree dated 13.5.2005.
Against this order, plaintiffs filed first regular appeal before the Additional
District Judge. The said appeal was dismissed by the appellate court vide its
judgment dated 8.12.2006. Aggrieved by the judgment of the first appellate
court, the second appeal has been filed by the plaintiffs under Section 100 of
the Civil Procedure Code (hereinafter referred to as CPC).
2. Following substantial
question of law was formulated on 3.8.2009:-
question of law was formulated on 3.8.2009:-
“Whether the trial
court rightly construed the provision of Limitation Act while coming to the
conclusion that the suit was barred by limitation and also the date from which
the cause of action is alleged to have accrue in favour of plaintiff while considering
the issue of limitation.”
court rightly construed the provision of Limitation Act while coming to the
conclusion that the suit was barred by limitation and also the date from which
the cause of action is alleged to have accrue in favour of plaintiff while considering
the issue of limitation.”
3. Mr. J.C. Mahindroo,
learned counsel for the plaintiffs, has contended that the cause of action
arose in favour of the plaintiffs on 9.1.1976 when the lands of Sh. Rama Nand
were acquired and thereafter it arose when Sh. Rama Nand died and his estate
was inherited by his heirs. He argued that cause of action further arose when
application for alternative plot was made by the defendant No.5 by playing
fraud and claiming himself to be the sole and exclusive heir of the deceased
Rama Nand. It further arose when objection applications were made with the
defendants No.1 to 4 on various dates. He further submitted that cause of
action again arose when Nahar Singh died on 14.5.1993 and plaintiffs being his
legal heirs stepped into his shoes and again it arose when the allotment was
made and then when the defendant No.5 started holding himself to be the
exclusive allottee and tried to negotiate for sale of the allotment of the suit
plot and lastly on 27.5.2000 when defendant No.5 finally refused to accede to
the request of the plaintiffs. Therefore, according to him the suit has been
filed within the period of limitation of three years which started running
against the plaintiffs on 27.5.2000 and the suit was filed on 29.5.2000 i.e. well
within the period of limitation.
learned counsel for the plaintiffs, has contended that the cause of action
arose in favour of the plaintiffs on 9.1.1976 when the lands of Sh. Rama Nand
were acquired and thereafter it arose when Sh. Rama Nand died and his estate
was inherited by his heirs. He argued that cause of action further arose when
application for alternative plot was made by the defendant No.5 by playing
fraud and claiming himself to be the sole and exclusive heir of the deceased
Rama Nand. It further arose when objection applications were made with the
defendants No.1 to 4 on various dates. He further submitted that cause of
action again arose when Nahar Singh died on 14.5.1993 and plaintiffs being his
legal heirs stepped into his shoes and again it arose when the allotment was
made and then when the defendant No.5 started holding himself to be the
exclusive allottee and tried to negotiate for sale of the allotment of the suit
plot and lastly on 27.5.2000 when defendant No.5 finally refused to accede to
the request of the plaintiffs. Therefore, according to him the suit has been
filed within the period of limitation of three years which started running
against the plaintiffs on 27.5.2000 and the suit was filed on 29.5.2000 i.e. well
within the period of limitation.
4. Mr. S.D. Singh,
learned counsel for the defendant No.5 has submitted that the suit of the
plaintiffs as per their own admission in the plaint is barred by period of
limitation. Article 58 of the Schedule to the Limitation Act prescribes period
of limitation of three years for a suit seeking declaratory relief and
limitation started running when the right to sue first accrued. He further
argued that the plaintiffs and their predecessor in interest had come to know
about the misuse of the impugned relinquishment deed executed on 21.10.1985
vide letter dated 8.3.1991 and they has raised objection vide their application
dated 5.4.1991 objecting to the allotment of the plot to the defendant No.5. He
further argued that suit property was allotted to defendant No.5 by the DDA in
the year 1994.
learned counsel for the defendant No.5 has submitted that the suit of the
plaintiffs as per their own admission in the plaint is barred by period of
limitation. Article 58 of the Schedule to the Limitation Act prescribes period
of limitation of three years for a suit seeking declaratory relief and
limitation started running when the right to sue first accrued. He further
argued that the plaintiffs and their predecessor in interest had come to know
about the misuse of the impugned relinquishment deed executed on 21.10.1985
vide letter dated 8.3.1991 and they has raised objection vide their application
dated 5.4.1991 objecting to the allotment of the plot to the defendant No.5. He
further argued that suit property was allotted to defendant No.5 by the DDA in
the year 1994.
5. It is submitted by
the learned counsel that draw of lots is the consequence of recommendation and
allotment on the basis of relinquishment deed and plaintiffs cannot question
the draw of lots unless the relinquishment deed, recommendation, sanction and
allotment made in the year 1991 and 1994 are declared null and void. Therefore,
apparently the relief of declaration as claimed by the plaintiffs is barred by
period of limitation.
the learned counsel that draw of lots is the consequence of recommendation and
allotment on the basis of relinquishment deed and plaintiffs cannot question
the draw of lots unless the relinquishment deed, recommendation, sanction and
allotment made in the year 1991 and 1994 are declared null and void. Therefore,
apparently the relief of declaration as claimed by the plaintiffs is barred by
period of limitation.
6. Article 58, Schedule
I, Part III, of the Limitation Act prescribes the period of limitation to
obtain a declaration not covered by any other article under this part (part
III).
I, Part III, of the Limitation Act prescribes the period of limitation to
obtain a declaration not covered by any other article under this part (part
III).
7. Article 58 of the
Limitation Act therefore is a residuary article so far as the suits for
declarations are concerned excepting declarations under Article 56 and 57.
Limitation Act therefore is a residuary article so far as the suits for
declarations are concerned excepting declarations under Article 56 and 57.
8. Thus, it is clear
that period of limitation for suits for declarations is three years from the
date when the right to sue first accrues. What is relevant in this article is
that the limitation starts running on the date when the right to sue first
accrues and not on subsequent dates even if a cause of action has arisen on
subsequent occasions as well. The right to sue can be treated as having arisen
when there was clear or unequivocal threat proceeding from the opponent and
that a threat which clearly invades or jeopardizes the plaintiffs‟ right can be
taken as giving rise to a cause of action to take steps for smothering such a
threat. As per the language of the article computation of the period of
limitation has to be done by tracking it back to the time when the right to sue
accrued for the first time.
that period of limitation for suits for declarations is three years from the
date when the right to sue first accrues. What is relevant in this article is
that the limitation starts running on the date when the right to sue first
accrues and not on subsequent dates even if a cause of action has arisen on
subsequent occasions as well. The right to sue can be treated as having arisen
when there was clear or unequivocal threat proceeding from the opponent and
that a threat which clearly invades or jeopardizes the plaintiffs‟ right can be
taken as giving rise to a cause of action to take steps for smothering such a
threat. As per the language of the article computation of the period of
limitation has to be done by tracking it back to the time when the right to sue
accrued for the first time.
9. The exact antecedent
of the word „first‟ in article 58 is that when any act or assertion of the defendant
threatened that gives plaintiff a cause of action. In a suit for declaration
the right to sue accrues when the defendant actually tries to assert his right
and interferes with the possession of the plaintiff and not when the defendant
is successful in getting the property in his name.
of the word „first‟ in article 58 is that when any act or assertion of the defendant
threatened that gives plaintiff a cause of action. In a suit for declaration
the right to sue accrues when the defendant actually tries to assert his right
and interferes with the possession of the plaintiff and not when the defendant
is successful in getting the property in his name.
10. The impugned
relinquishment deed was executed by the predecessor in interest of the
plaintiffs in favour of Dhan Singh defendant No.5 on 21.10.1985. Nahar Singh,
predecessor in interest of the plaintiffs, got the knowledge that Dhan Singh
had misused the said relinquishment deed in order to deprive his rights and
that of other legal heirs of deceased Rama Nand in the alternative plot to be
allotted in lieu of the acquired land vide letter No. 31(11)/8/87 L&B/Alt/8226
dated 8.3.1991. This letter was addressed to defendant No.5 by Land and
Building Department regarding allotment of alternative plot. Thereafter Nahar
Singh wrote an objection letter dated 5.4.1991 to DDA and Land and Building
Department. He died on 14.5.1993. Plaintiff No. 1 also filed an objection
application addressed to Joint Secretary Land and Building on 9.5.1995,
16.9.1998, 3.8.1999 and thereafter.
relinquishment deed was executed by the predecessor in interest of the
plaintiffs in favour of Dhan Singh defendant No.5 on 21.10.1985. Nahar Singh,
predecessor in interest of the plaintiffs, got the knowledge that Dhan Singh
had misused the said relinquishment deed in order to deprive his rights and
that of other legal heirs of deceased Rama Nand in the alternative plot to be
allotted in lieu of the acquired land vide letter No. 31(11)/8/87 L&B/Alt/8226
dated 8.3.1991. This letter was addressed to defendant No.5 by Land and
Building Department regarding allotment of alternative plot. Thereafter Nahar
Singh wrote an objection letter dated 5.4.1991 to DDA and Land and Building
Department. He died on 14.5.1993. Plaintiff No. 1 also filed an objection
application addressed to Joint Secretary Land and Building on 9.5.1995,
16.9.1998, 3.8.1999 and thereafter.
11. Letter dated
30.12.1994 was written by Land and Building department to DDA requesting it to
allot an alternative plot to Dhan Singh. A list of allotment was circulated
wherein the name of Dhan Singh was shown at No. 023(0018)/94 as allottee of 300
sq. meter plot at Rohini. Vide letter dated 7.7.2000 DDA informed Dhan Singh
that it had recommended allotment of an alternative plot to him on perpetual
lease hold basis vide Land and Building department letter dated 30.12.1994. As
per para 25 of the plaint, cause of action lastly arose on 27.5.2000 when
defendant No.5 finally refused to accede to the request of the plaintiffs.
30.12.1994 was written by Land and Building department to DDA requesting it to
allot an alternative plot to Dhan Singh. A list of allotment was circulated
wherein the name of Dhan Singh was shown at No. 023(0018)/94 as allottee of 300
sq. meter plot at Rohini. Vide letter dated 7.7.2000 DDA informed Dhan Singh
that it had recommended allotment of an alternative plot to him on perpetual
lease hold basis vide Land and Building department letter dated 30.12.1994. As
per para 25 of the plaint, cause of action lastly arose on 27.5.2000 when
defendant No.5 finally refused to accede to the request of the plaintiffs.
Therefore, as per the pleadings contained in the plaint itself, the cause of
action first accrued in favour of the plaintiffs or their predecessor in
interest i.e. Nahar Singh on his coming to know of letter dated 8.3.1991 that
Dhan Singh had misused the relinquishment deed in order to get the alternative
plot in lieu of the acquired land allotted in his name. Correspondences
exchanged between Nahar Singh and the departments as well as the present
plaintiffs and the defendants No. 1 to 4 cannot be construed as giving rise to
any fresh cause of action in favour of the plaintiffs and against the
defendants.
action first accrued in favour of the plaintiffs or their predecessor in
interest i.e. Nahar Singh on his coming to know of letter dated 8.3.1991 that
Dhan Singh had misused the relinquishment deed in order to get the alternative
plot in lieu of the acquired land allotted in his name. Correspondences
exchanged between Nahar Singh and the departments as well as the present
plaintiffs and the defendants No. 1 to 4 cannot be construed as giving rise to
any fresh cause of action in favour of the plaintiffs and against the
defendants.
Even if the cause of action arose on the date when the allotment
letter was circulated in the year 1994 wherein defendant No.5 has been shown as
an allottee of 300 sq. meter of plot at Rohini, then also the present suit is
barred by period of limitation having been filed on 29.5.2000. Reference is
made to Secretary, Ministry of Works and Housing v. Mohinder Singh Jagdev and
others – (1996) 6 SCC 229 and State of Punjab v. Balkaran Singh – (2006) 12 SCC
709.
letter was circulated in the year 1994 wherein defendant No.5 has been shown as
an allottee of 300 sq. meter of plot at Rohini, then also the present suit is
barred by period of limitation having been filed on 29.5.2000. Reference is
made to Secretary, Ministry of Works and Housing v. Mohinder Singh Jagdev and
others – (1996) 6 SCC 229 and State of Punjab v. Balkaran Singh – (2006) 12 SCC
709.
12. Learned counsel for
the plaintiffs has referred to Ajudh Raj and others v. Moti – (1991) 3 SCC 136. This case is of no
help to the plaintiffs as it related to a suit for title to an immovable
property and it was observed that where a suit for title to an immovable
property; subject matter of the case under a special act, if an adverse order
comes in the way to the success of the plaintiff, he must get it cleared before
proceeding further. But in case such order has been passed without
jurisdiction, the same can be ignored being a nullity, i.e. non- existent in
the eyes of law and such a suit will be governed by article 65. The facts and
circumstances of this case are completely different in nature and the relief
claimed is of declaration for declaring the relinquishment deed executed by the
predecessor in interest of the plaintiffs as null and void.
the plaintiffs has referred to Ajudh Raj and others v. Moti – (1991) 3 SCC 136. This case is of no
help to the plaintiffs as it related to a suit for title to an immovable
property and it was observed that where a suit for title to an immovable
property; subject matter of the case under a special act, if an adverse order
comes in the way to the success of the plaintiff, he must get it cleared before
proceeding further. But in case such order has been passed without
jurisdiction, the same can be ignored being a nullity, i.e. non- existent in
the eyes of law and such a suit will be governed by article 65. The facts and
circumstances of this case are completely different in nature and the relief
claimed is of declaration for declaring the relinquishment deed executed by the
predecessor in interest of the plaintiffs as null and void.
13. Similarly Kuldeep
Singh v. Ganpat Lal and another – (1996) 1 SCC 243, wherein an application
under Order VII Rule (1)(e) CPC was filed for eviction of a tenant on the
grounds of default in payment of rent for six months and the plaint did not
disclose the cause of action, it was observed that purpose of plaintiff in
indicating the date on which the cause of action arose would be of little
consequence if the cause of action had arisen on the date on which the suit was
filed and the suit was within limitation on the said date, does not come to the
rescue of the plaintiffs in any manner.
Singh v. Ganpat Lal and another – (1996) 1 SCC 243, wherein an application
under Order VII Rule (1)(e) CPC was filed for eviction of a tenant on the
grounds of default in payment of rent for six months and the plaint did not
disclose the cause of action, it was observed that purpose of plaintiff in
indicating the date on which the cause of action arose would be of little
consequence if the cause of action had arisen on the date on which the suit was
filed and the suit was within limitation on the said date, does not come to the
rescue of the plaintiffs in any manner.
14. Plaintiffs have
claimed knowledge of misuser of the impugned relinquishment deed by Dhan Singh
vide letter dated 8.3.1991. As per Section 17 of the Limitation Act the plaintiffs
have to prove that they were kept out of the knowledge of their right to sue or
apply by that fraud or mistake. This is not the case before me. In case of a
suit or an application, limitation runs from the date when the fraud becomes
known to the plaintiffs or applicant who is injuriously affected by the fraud.
The knowledge referred to in Section 17 of the Act is clear and definite
knowledge of the facts constituting the particular fraud and not a mere
suspicion. To bring a case within the Section the plaintiff or applicant must
allege both the fraud and the date when the fraud pleaded came to his
knowledge. As pointed out above, plaintiffs have pleaded fraud and its
knowledge vide letter dated 8.3.1991.
claimed knowledge of misuser of the impugned relinquishment deed by Dhan Singh
vide letter dated 8.3.1991. As per Section 17 of the Limitation Act the plaintiffs
have to prove that they were kept out of the knowledge of their right to sue or
apply by that fraud or mistake. This is not the case before me. In case of a
suit or an application, limitation runs from the date when the fraud becomes
known to the plaintiffs or applicant who is injuriously affected by the fraud.
The knowledge referred to in Section 17 of the Act is clear and definite
knowledge of the facts constituting the particular fraud and not a mere
suspicion. To bring a case within the Section the plaintiff or applicant must
allege both the fraud and the date when the fraud pleaded came to his
knowledge. As pointed out above, plaintiffs have pleaded fraud and its
knowledge vide letter dated 8.3.1991.
Therefore, even by virtue of Section 17 of
the Limitation Act, period of limitation started running against the plaintiffs
on 8.3.1991. The present suit having been filed on 29.5.2000 is after the
expiry of period of three years and therefore is barred by period of
limitation.
the Limitation Act, period of limitation started running against the plaintiffs
on 8.3.1991. The present suit having been filed on 29.5.2000 is after the
expiry of period of three years and therefore is barred by period of
limitation.
15. The first appellate
court rightly observed that cause of action arose in favour of Nahar Singh on
the date when it came to his knowledge on 8.3.1991 that a fraud had been played
upon him by defendant No.5 and since he did not choose to get the impugned
relinquishment deed cancelled during his life time and the present suit having
been filed on the basis of alleged cause of action having accrued on the
subsequent dates i.e. date of allotment is barred by period of limitation.
court rightly observed that cause of action arose in favour of Nahar Singh on
the date when it came to his knowledge on 8.3.1991 that a fraud had been played
upon him by defendant No.5 and since he did not choose to get the impugned
relinquishment deed cancelled during his life time and the present suit having
been filed on the basis of alleged cause of action having accrued on the
subsequent dates i.e. date of allotment is barred by period of limitation.
16. Learned counsel for
the plaintiffs has referred to letter dated 7.7.2000 whereby DDA informed Dhan
Singh that it had recommended allotment of an alternative plot to him on
perpetual lease on the basis of the Land and Building department letter dated
30.12.1994 and therefore, according to him a fresh cause of action arose in
favour of the plaintiffs on 7.7.2000. The present suit having been filed in the
same year is within the period of limitation.
the plaintiffs has referred to letter dated 7.7.2000 whereby DDA informed Dhan
Singh that it had recommended allotment of an alternative plot to him on
perpetual lease on the basis of the Land and Building department letter dated
30.12.1994 and therefore, according to him a fresh cause of action arose in
favour of the plaintiffs on 7.7.2000. The present suit having been filed in the
same year is within the period of limitation.
17. As discussed above,
the cause of action first accrued in favour of the predecessor in interest of
the plaintiffs on 8.3.1991 when Nahar Singh came to know about the fraud being
played by Dhan Singh to get the alternative plot allotted in his name on the
basis of the relinquishment deed and therefore, by virtue of article 58 the
period of limitation started running against Nahar Singh and thereafter his
legal heirs; the plaintiffs from 8.3.1991. The present suit having been filed
after nine years is barred by period of limitation.
the cause of action first accrued in favour of the predecessor in interest of
the plaintiffs on 8.3.1991 when Nahar Singh came to know about the fraud being
played by Dhan Singh to get the alternative plot allotted in his name on the
basis of the relinquishment deed and therefore, by virtue of article 58 the
period of limitation started running against Nahar Singh and thereafter his
legal heirs; the plaintiffs from 8.3.1991. The present suit having been filed
after nine years is barred by period of limitation.
18. Therefore, I
conclude that the trial court rightly construed the provisions of Limitation
Act while coming to the conclusion that the suit was barred by period of
limitation and also the date on which the cause of action accrued in favour of
the plaintiffs while considering the issue of limitation.
conclude that the trial court rightly construed the provisions of Limitation
Act while coming to the conclusion that the suit was barred by period of
limitation and also the date on which the cause of action accrued in favour of
the plaintiffs while considering the issue of limitation.
19. Hence, I find no merits
in the appeal and the same is accordingly dismissed.
in the appeal and the same is accordingly dismissed.
(ARUNA SURESH) JUDGE
AUGUST 25, 2009 jk
AUGUST 25, 2009 jk